Manne wrote:
Spain's El Clasico is Sunday: Real Madrid against Barcelona in the Spanish capital. Can Cristiano Ronaldo knock out Lionel Messi? Fans around the globe will flock to screens to see who owns the punch.
In the past 10 years, stamp the contest for the Spanish football crown as exclusive. Barca or Real is dominant. Spain's other clubs spar beneath the heavyweights, unable to get a shot at the title. This year is different. Another Madrid team, Atletico, is in the ring fighting for first, a rogue upsetting the balance. Mark the card for relief.
Europe's elite club soccer is an oligopoly's dream. A few sellers of football dominate the market forever and ever, amen. Occasionally, the odd upstart clambers up from below, prompting the superiors to purchase its valuable playing assets, snuffing out the threat for next season. Arrivistes can stick around if they can tap lines of credit from oligarchs, billionaires, sports magnates or oil wells.
In the lower divisions, teams struggle. But few die. There are always business interests willing to invest in the promise of miracles. Who knows? Perhaps a young player comes out of the sticks, leads the team to glory and then gets sold for a healthy profit.
Soccer's structure provides incentive. Interleague relegation and promotion, the trapdoor and the elevator, are integral to hope and fear for fans and money alike. See it as a free-market fight for a seat at the top table where the big boys eat. "Best to throw a crumb to the up and coming," the portly say. After all, they need teams to play and beat every week. (Note: Major League Soccer is a single entity without promotion and relegation.)
Soccer powers are global. On the TV news, witness riots in various countries and you might see a Molotov cocktail being thrown by a rebel wearing a Barca or Real jersey. The game's economy is also local, where the roots run deep. An English Twitter feed, Football Away Days, posts photographs of traveling supporters often in half-empty stadiums, wearing jerseys of teams that will not be appearing in the middle of a televised revolution in a febrile part of the world. These fans follow clubs that will win nothing, one generation passing down emptiness to the next. Call it loyalty to the local, the small-town economy keeping football alive beneath the elites.
Rallying the Quakes: Many witnessed the super performance of the Earthquakes on Saturday in their opening game of the MLS season against Salt Lake. Marvel at it. The Quakes fought back from 3-1 down and scored the equalizer in the 95th minute. The Earthquakes have 17 second-half stoppage-time goals in all competitions since 2012, 15 of which tied or won the game. Defy the laws of football math!
I watched the game standing in Section 109 at Buck Shaw Stadium, the manor of the 1906 Ultras, the Quakes' supporters group. Their rallying call ceaseless, a magnet, they pulled in the Quakes' attack like a tide. The players love it. You can see how much it means to them to score at the Ultras' end. It's pretty special. When the tying goal went in, the Ultras exploded behind the net. Proof that when the support is fierce and close to the action, the fans influence the result.
The Quakes would do well to integrate the Ultras into the plans at the new stadium - as close to the action as possible. Polish the 12th man cliche. At San Jose, it delivers wins.
(Sunday: Real Madrid vs. Barcelona, 1 p.m.)
Soccer's appeal runs international and local - SFGate
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2014/11/13
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First, a primer on the complex relationship between the US and immigrants. On the one hand, all of us, except for Native Americans, are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants. The Statute of Liberty says "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses." For decades, immigrants from Europe waltzed through long lines at Ellis Island, filled out paperwork upon arrival, proved they didn't have tuberculosis (or worse, were trade unionists!), and then got a ticket to the American dream. Acceptance upon arrival with scant qualifications was the law. Yet, while the law reflected an open doors policy, simmering tensions existed between the early arrivers and newcomers. For example, Benjamin Franklin famously complained about German immigrants and their reluctance to learn English. Many folks' grandparents will recall the days when "Irish need not apply" signs dotted the windows of businesses up and down the East Coast.
If immigrants were accepted but then marginalized, then soccer in the US during the early 20th century followed a similar track. Dubbed an "immigrants' game", other so-called "native sports" like basketball, baseball, and football grew exponentially in popularity. The US fielded world class athletes that consistently won Olympic gold, but failed to qualify for a World Cup from 1954 to 1990. The roster for the 1950 team featured three Italian-Americans, Charlie Colombo, Frank Wallace, and Gino Pariani, from the Hill Neighborhood of St. Louis. In fact, Frank Wallace's birth name was Frank Valicenti but his family changed it (possibly due to discrimination or a desire to assimilate, or both). The US team also featured Joe Gaetjens, a Haitian of German descent who immigrated to the US, studied at Columbia University, and scored the winning goal vs. England off a header. Defender Joe Maca was also an immigrant from Belgium and Ed Mcllvenny was Scottish.
From 1950 to 1994, the number of immigrants on the US team increased exponentially. US Soccer welcomed with open arms players from Europe and South America. Bora instilled a remarkable team spirit and confidence, and the team went on a dazzling run at USA '94. Then, though, the disaster of 1998 happened. Despite veteran defender Jeff Agoos playing okay in qualifying, coach Steve Sampson heavily recruited French-American David Regis. Sampson swore he didn't promise him a starting spot, but Regis became a citizen just in time for the World Cup and started all three group games. He was joined by other immigrants Dooley, Wegerle, Ramos, and "Preki" Radosavljevic of Serbia. Unlike 94, Sampson failed to find the right team chemistry. The unexpected removal of John Harkes and arrival of Regis rubbed senior players, perhaps past their prime, the wrong way. The team lost all three games and finished last.
Then we enter the Bruce Arena era. MLS had been in existence since 1996, giving American-born talent a viable professional league to ply their trade. More importantly, Arena confirmed in an interview that he felt recruiting two-passport players with servicemen fathers was "against the spirit". For Korea/Japan 2002, the US roster featured only four immigrants: Pablo Mastroeni, an Argentine who grew up in the US and played in MLS, Carlos Llamosa, a Colombian who played in MLS, Regis, and Earnie Stewart. A cosmopolitan roster this was not. However, the team clicked, upsetting Portugal in the opening game and going on a run to the quarterfinals.
The 2006 roster featured only a single immigrant: Pablo Mastroeni. The team also lost two games, tied Italy, and exited in the group stages. More importantly, Arena will be remembered for the star player who got away: Giuseppe Rossi. At the time, Rossi was a promising star at Manchester United. He had not yet been capped by Italy, and was fair game. Bruce Arena faxed a request to United to allow Rossi to come to a friendly. He also called Rossi a few times and invited him to a camp, but no dice. Arena admitted that Rossi would have been a great addition to the '06 team and many feel Arena could have and should have done more.
So, the Arena era whimpered to an end with a one immigrant and zero loss showing at the World Cup. Then came Bob Bradley, an American with extensive experience in MLS. At the time, Rossi was still fair game. While Bruce was perhaps reticent to suck up to Rossi, Bradley at least gave it a second effort. He even attempted a classic coach recruiting trick: he spoke to Rossi's dad, a coach at Clifton High in New Jersey. Dad made it clear that Rossi respected the US, but his dream was to play for Italy. He soon got capped by Italy during World Cup qualifying, and that was that. Bradley, though, still expanded the reach of the US program. His roster for South Africa 2010 featured two players from the Mexican League, Francisco Torres and Herculez Gomez. He convinced Scotsman Stu Holden to play for the US. He convinced Torres to play for the US instead of possibly Mexico. Lastly, after the World Cup, Bradley convinced Jermain Jones to don the red, white and blue.
And then we entered the Klinsmann era. A look at the recent US friendly with the Ukraine shows a plethora of two passport players: Fabian Johnson, John Brooks, Aron Johannsson, Mix Diskerud, to name a few. If Bradley subtly worked behind the scenes to get dual passport players, then Klinsmann has been much more public. Like France 98, this initially rubbed player